Seminar by – Kunal Dasgupta, University of Toronto, 27th April, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PM

 Distribution Costs, Product Quality, and Cross-Country Income Differences byKunal Dasgupta University of Toronto On27th April, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PMVenue : Seminar Room (First Floor) Department of Economics, Delhi School of EconomicsAll are cordially invitedAbstractWe document that the efficiency of trade distribution systems have an important export country specific component: all else equal, wealthier countries have smaller but more frequent export shipments. A model of distribution and trade reveals that (i) this outcome is consistent with wealthier countries having lower per-shipment export costs and (ii) these lower costs give wealthier countries a comparative advantage in high quality products. Using the models

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Seminar by – Brishti Guha, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 20th April, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PM

  Grandparents as Guards: Inheritance and Post Marital Residence in a World of Uncertain Paternity byBrishti GuhaJawaharlal Nehru University On20th April, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PMVenue : Seminar Room (First Floor) Department of Economics, Delhi School of EconomicsAll are cordially invitedAbstractI unify the following (1) men face paternity uncertainty while women do not face maternity uncertainty, (2) putative fathers and paternal kin care about true paternity, (3) paternity confidence is systematically lower in matrilocal cultures than in patrilocal ones, (4) inheritance tends to be patrilineal where paternity confidence is high and matrilineal where it is low, and (5) most societies with patrilineal inheritance

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Seminar by- Girish Bahal, National Council of Applied Economic Research, 13th April, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PM

  Employment Guarantee Schemes and Wages in India byGirish BahalNational Council of Applied Economic Research On13th April, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PMVenue : Seminar Room (First Floor)Department of Economics, Delhi School of EconomicsAll are cordially invitedAbstractUsing a novel data-set of district-wise program expenditure, we estimate the impact of large employment schemes on agricultural wages in India. Depending on the underlying theoretical mechanism, private wages can either respond to contemporaneous fluctuations in program expenditure or be sensitive to the stock of expenditure incurred under such programs. We first find that although program expenditure varied substantially both across and within districts, every district was

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Seminar by- Anand Shrivastava, University of Cambridge, 6th April, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PM

  Labor Market Effects of Inconsistent Policy Interventions: Evidence From India’s Employment Guarantees byAnand ShrivastavaAzim Premji University On6th April, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PMVenue : Seminar Room (First Floor) Department of Economics, Delhi School of EconomicsAll are cordially invitedAbstractRecent evidence suggests that large employment guarantee schemes in India have increased private wages. Juxtaposed with this body of work are studies that show how the lack of administrative capacity, political will, and other supply factors cause program provision to be rather limited and highly variable across districts and over time. This paper attempts to understand the cost of variability in program provision in terms

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Seminar by- Vidya Soundararajan IIM, Bangalore, 30th March, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PM

  Role of Political Activists in Clientelistic Settings: Evidence from an Indian Public Works ProgrambyVidya SoundararajanIIM, Bangalore On30th March, 2017 (Thursday) at 3:00 PMVenue : Seminar Room (First Floor) Department of Economics, Delhi School of EconomicsAll are cordially invitedAbstractIn a setting of clientelistic politics where ruling politicians make preferential transfers to bolster political support, our model introduces a new voter identity: political activists who are influential and potentially change the political allegiance of other voters. Given these new players, do politicians now offer transfers only to target swing voters who choose political affiliation when presented with transfers, or also to “convert” activists

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