Seminar by- Sourav, Royal Holloway, University of London, 16th August, 2016 (Tuesday) at 3:00 PM

 A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in ElectionsbySourav Bhattacharya  Royal Holloway, University of London On16th August, 2016 (Tuesday) at 3:00 PMVenue : Seminar Room (First Floor) Department of Economics, Delhi School of EconomicsAll are cordially invitedAbstractWe study aggregation of private information in large elections where all voters have the same preference. There are many states of the world, and each state is identified with a preference ranking over alternatives and a probability distribution over signals. Each voter draws his private signal independently from the said distribution conditional on the state. When there are two alternatives (say A and B), we

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Seminar by- Anukriti, Boston College, 11th August, 2016 (Thursday) at 3:00 PM

 Dowry: Household Responses to Expected Marriage Paymentsby Anukriti Boston CollegeOn11th August, 2016 (Thursday) at 3:00 PMVenue : Seminar Room (First Floor)Department of Economics, Delhi School of EconomicsAll are cordially invited AbstractDowry is a ubiquitous feature of South Asian marriage markets. Using retrospective data on 39,544 marriages that occurred during 1960-2008, first we describe dowry trends in contemporary rural India. We find that average real net dowry has remained stable over time; however, there is considerable temporal and cross-sectional variation across religions, castes, and states. We then examine how dowry expectations affect household savings, parents’ labor supply, and child investments. 

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Seminar by- Debasis Mondal, IIT Delhi, 4th August, 2016 (Thursday) at 3:00 PM

Private provision of public good and endogenous income inequalitybyDebasis Mondal Indian Institute of Technology Delhi  On4th August, 2016 (Thursday) at 3:00 PMVenue : Seminar Room (First Floor) Department of Economics, Delhi School of EconomicsAll are cordially invitedAbstractIn traditional models of public goods with voluntary provision (as like, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986), size of the non-contributing set does not affect the aggregate level of provision. A transfer of resources from the contributor to the non-contributor without changing their size, unambiguously lowers the aggregate level of provision. Also, aggregate provision level increases with the aggregate wealth level of the contributing set.

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